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&e national exit examinations important for
educational efficiency?
John H. Bishop*
Summary
. This paper analyses effects of national or provincial exit examina-
tions on educational quality. On theoretical grounds, the paper argues
that such examinations should increase high school student achieve-
ment, particularly in examination subjects, and that teachers and stu-
dents and parents and school administrators should focus more on
academic achievement when making school-quality decisions. On the
negative side, exit examinations may lead to a tendency to concen-
trate on learning facts, rather than understanding contexts.
The hypotheses are tested using several datascts, including coun-
tries and provinces with and without external exit examinations. The
conclusion from the empirical tests is that positive effects are likely to
dominate. Students in countries with these exams tend to outperform
students in other countries in science, math, reading, and geography,
when national economic development levels are accounted for.
The paper also argues that the elimination of the Swedish exit
examination system in the 1970s, in combination with changes in the
way university applicants were selected, appears to have led to a de-
cline in the number of upper secondary school students taking rigor-
ous courses in mathematics and science.
The paper also analyzes the mechanisms behind the positive rela-
tion between external exit examinations and student achievements. It
is found that exit examinations are associated with higher require-
ments for entry into the teaching profession, higher teacher salaries,
higher shares of specialized teachers, and many teaching hours in ex-
amination subjects. But external exit examinations were not found to
be associated with higher teacher-student ratios, more spending on
education, or higher teacher satisfaction. .
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Are national exit examinations
important for educational efficiency?
John H. Bishop *
In many countries, national or provincial exit examinations certify
and signal achievements of secondary school students to universities
and employers. These examinations are thought to have significant
effects on how teachers teach and how students study, so the char-
acter of these examinations has been a source of controversy in many
countries. Efforts to refoan secondary education almost always involve
changes in examination systems. The English merged the old Certificate
of Secondary Education (CSE) and the 0 level exams into the General
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE). France broadened the list of
Baccalaureate examinations to include many vocational specialities and
has set a goal of more than 80% of the age cohort participating by 2000.
The Brevet exam at the end of lower secondary schoo~ which had been
abolished in 1977,was re-introduced in 1986. "The reasons were that the
results had been declining in the experience of many people ... (Kreeft,
1990, p. 6)." The Canadian provinces of Manitoba and New Brunswick
are re-establishing curriculum-based exit e..xaminationsthat had been dis-
continued in the early 1970s.
Curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs) arc also being con-
sidered in the US. The Competitiveness Polic.:yCouncil, for example, ad-
vocates that
external assessments be given to individual students at the secon-
dary level and that the results should be a major but not exclusive
factor qualifying for college and better jobs at better wages (1993,
p.30).
.
The Center for Adt,t11m!d Human &SOUTre Studies and tbe Consortium jiJr Poli'J &.rearch in
Rrmcation (funded I:(y the Office of Educationa! Rmarrh and [mpro~~ment, US Department of
Education j suppomd the preparation of this paper.
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The American Federation of Teachers advocates a system in which:
Students are periodically tested on whether they're reaching the
standards, and if they are not, the system responds with appropri-
ate assistance and intervention. Until they meet the standards, they
won't be able to graduate £rom high school or enter college (AFT,
1995, p. 1-2).
These two quotes represent the views of many educational reformers in
the countries that do not currently have a system of diploma examina-
tions. These reformers argue that "curriculum-based e..xtemalexit exam
systems" (CBEEESs), based on world-class content standards, will im-
prove teaching and learning of core subjects. Is this claim justified? This
paper analyses data £rom four large-scale intemarional studies of student
achievement and attempts to answer this question.
1. Theory: why curriculum-based external exit exams
change incentives
What is a CBEEES? Critics of moves to establish or re-establish exit
examination systems point out that students already take lots of teacher-
made tests. American students also take many narionally standardised
tests. So the critics ask ''\X'hy should a CBEEES significantly improve
incentives and learning?" Ine response of CBEEES advocates is that
CBEEESs have uniquely powerful incentive effects because they have
these six characteristics; they:
1. Produce Jignals rf student acromplishm.ent that hiM real ronsequencesfOr students.
2. Difine achievementrelativeto an external standard, not relatit't: to olher students
in the c!aJJroomor the schooLFair comparisons of achievemcntacross
schools and across students at different schools are now possible.
CostreU's (1994, 1997) fonnal analysis of the optimal setting of edu-
cational standards concludcd that more ccntralised standard setting
(state or national achievement exams) generally results in higher
standards, highcr achievemcnt, and higher social welfare than decen-
traJised standard setting (i.e., teacher grading or schools' graduation
requirements) .
3. An organised!?JdiJf!iplineand krJled 10 the amlenl rf specificCOUT'Jes quences.
This focuses responsibility for preparing the student for particular
exams on a small group of tC'achers.
4. Signal muliiple levelsflfachiez;ementin the subject. If onlya pass-failsignalis
generated by an exam, the stmdard will have to be set low enough to
352
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allow almost everyone to pass and this will nQt stimulatethe great
bulk of students to greater effort (Kang, 1985; Costrell, 1994). By age
13, students differ dramatically in their achievement levels. On the
National AsseJJmentrf EducationalProgress,7-9% of 13 year aids are
four or more grade-level equivalents behind their age mates and 15-
17% are four or more grade-level equivalents ahead. When achieve-
ment differentials among students are as large as this, incentives for
effort are stronger for most students if the full range of achievement
is signalled rather than just whether the individual has passed some
absolute standard. When a test generates only a pass-fail signal, many
students pass without exertion and are thus not stimulated to greater
effort by the reward for passing. Some of the least well-prepared stu-
dents will judge the effort required to achieve the standard to be too
great and the benefits too small to warrant the effort. They give up
on the idea of meeting the standard. Few students will find the re-
ward, for exceeding a single absolute cut-off, an incentive for greater
effort (Kang, 1985). Costrell agrees:
The case for perfect information (making scores on external
examinations available rather than just whether the individual
passed or failed)would appear to be strong, if not airt1ght for
most plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and
pooling under decentralisation, perfect information not only
raises GDP, but also social welfare (1994a or b, p. 970).
5. Coz;eralmostall secondaryschoolstudents. Exams for a set of elite schools,
advanced courses, or college applicants will influence standards at the
top of the vertical curriculum but will probably have limited effects
on the rest of the students. 'loe school system as a whole must be
made to accept responsibility for how students do on the exams. A
single exam taken by all is not essential. Many nations allow students
to choose the subjects to be examined in and offer high- and inter-
mediate-level exams in the same subject.
6. Assess a mqjor portion 0/what students stut!Jinga J1Iijectare expected to know
or be able to do. But it is not essential that the external exam assess
every instructional objective. Teachers can be given responsibility for
evaluating dimensions of performance that cannot be reliably as-
sessed by external means.
i
,
.
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1.1. Why and how are CBEEESs hypothesised to
increase achievement?
National or provincial curriculum-based external exit examinations sys-
tems (CBEEESs) improve the signals of achievement available to col-
leges and employers, and this is likely to. induce them to give academic
achievement greater weight when they ~e admission and hiring deci-
sions. Rewards for study and learning should grow and become more
visible.
Effictsonstudents.Rewards are necessary because learning is not a pas-
sive act; it requires the time and active engagement of the learner. Stu-
dents have many other uses for their time and attention, so learning is
costly for them. The intensity of their investment in learning depends on
a comparison of benefits (intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for learning) to
costs. A rise in the benefits of learning increases student effort and
learning.
CBEEESs should also shift attention toward measures of absolute
achievement and away from measures of relative achievement, such as
rank in class and teacher grades. Advocates of CBEEESs hope that
CBEEESs will reduce peer pressure against studying. Interviews I con-
ducted during 1996and 1997with middle-school students in Ithaca, New
York (a small city dominated by two universities) indicate that most boys
intemalise a norm against "sucking up" to the teacher. How does a stu-
dent avoid being thought a J'Uckup?He:
. Avoids giving the teacher eye contact
. Does not raise his hand in class too frequently; and
. Talks or passes notes to friends during class (this signals that you
value tnends more than rapport with your teacher).
Steinberg, Brown and Dornbush conclude similarly that "The adoles-
cent peer culture in America demeans academic success and scorns stu-
dents who try to do well in school (1996, p.19)." My conversations with
Swedish students sometimes generate similar anecdotes.
Why are the studioLL~(:alled suck ups, dnrks, and nerds?In part, it may be
because grading exams on a curve me-JIlSthat study effort by one student
tends to make it mo~e difficult for others to get top grades. When exams
are graded on a lluve or college admissions are based on rank in class,
the joint welfare of students is maximised if no one puts in extr'J.effort.
In the repeated game that results, side payments~friendship and re-
spect-and punishments-ridicule, harJ.Ssment, and ostracism~nforce
354
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the co-operative "don't study" solution. If, by contrast, students Me
evaluated relative to an outside standard, they no longer have a personal
interest in getting teachers off track or persuading each other to refrain
from studying. Peers should, in theory, become less tolerant of students
who joke around in class or try to get the teacher off track.
Comparisons of the benefits and costs of focusing school re-
sources and policies on academic achievement also influence parents,
school administrators, and teachers. When a CBEEES is in place,
exam results displace social class as the primary determinant of
school reputations and this in turn should induce school staff to give
enhanced learning higher priority. Teachers will upgrade curricula and
assign more homework, and parents will demand better science labs
and more rigorous teaching. School administrators will be pressured
to increase the time devoted to examination subjects and hire more
qualified teachers. The next section elaborates on the theory briefly
described above.1 Figure 1 iJlusu-ates the many paths by which
CBEEESs are hypothesised to influence student achievement.
Figure 1. How CBEEESs influence student achievement
.
Curriculum-
based
external
exit
exam
system
Student
eIfort
,
..
CUlture,
productivity,
parental
s0cio-
economic
status (SES)
>;;-;;;:~~~,=,~~-<""'~t-<~;t:'AA'£:~:W-i:l:t~';',:"':::H<:~
¥ School resources
.t"""
..
..
.
1 Mathematical presentations of the theory arc available from the author upon re-
quest.
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2. Testable hypotheses:
Impacts of curriculum-based external exit exams
Students. The previously described theory predicts that
Hypothesis
1
Curriculum-based external fi'xit examinations will result in ...
Higher achievement. The effects. should be strongest the
year of the external examination. But they should reach
down to 7th and 8th grade though maybe not dm.vn to
early years of primary school.
2 Higher achievement, even when student characteristics,
school resources, curriculum, teacher qualifications, and
tcaching techniques are held constant.
Parents. Curriculum-bascd extcrnal exams are also hypothesised to
change incentives faced by parents and as a result, parents will put
greater effort into trying to induce their children to study regularly.
Hypothesis
3
Curriculum-based external exit examinations will...
Induce parents to spend more time talking with their
children about school wd result in student's perceiving
their parents to be more interested in thcir doing well in
examination subjects.
Opponents of external exams argue that focusing student atten-
tion on extrinsic rewards for learning will weaken student's intrinsic
motivation to leam. George Madaus' list of possible negative effects
includes "test scorcs comc to be rcgarded by parents and students as
the main, if not the sole, objective of education" and thc result is
undue attention to material that is covered in the examinations,
thereby excluding from teaching wd learning many worthwhile
educational objectives and experiences (1991, p. 7).
If they are right, students in systems with external exams should
be less likely to read for pleasure or to watch sciencc programs such
as NOVA and Ndture.
Hypothesis Studentswill ...
4 Spend less time watching science documentaries on TV
and less time reading for fun.
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School administrators. Local school administrators make hundreds
of decisions that inAuence academic expectations and program qual-
ity (e.g., homework guidelines and whether to retain a popular but
not very effective teacher). In many countries, schools are expected
to achieve a host of often conflicting objectives: fostering self-
esteem, providing counselling and supervising extra-curricular activi-
ties, musical training, health services, community entertainment (e.g.;
interscholastic sports). These other goals require additional staff and
different kinds of staff, and so the goals may not be achieved by hir-
ing teachers with strong backgrounds in calculus or chemistry.
When there is no external assessment of academic achievement,
students and their parents benefit little from administrative decisions
that opt for higher standards, more qualified teachers, or a heavier
student work load. The immediate consequences of such decisions-
higher taxes, more homework, having to repeat courses, lower grade-
point averages (GP As), complaining parents, a greater risk of being
denied a diploma-are all negative.
When student learning is not assessed externally, the positive ef-
fects of choosing academic rigor are negligible and postponed. If
college admission decisions are based on rank in class, GP A, and ap-
titude tests--and not on externally assessed achievement in secon-
dary school courses--then upgraded standards will not improve the
college admission prospects of next year's graduates. Graduates will
probably do better in difficult college courses and will be more likely
to get a degree, but that benefit is uncertain and far in the future.
Maybe over time the school's reputation and, with it, the admission
prospects of graduates will improve because current graduates are
more successful in local colleges. That, however, is even more un-
certain and postponed. Publishing data on proportions of students
meeting targets on standardised tests probably speeds the process by
which real improvements in a school's performance influence its lo-
cal reputation. But other indicators such as SAT test scores, propor-
tions going to various types of colleges, and the socioeconomic back-
ground of the students tend to be more prominent. As a result,
school reputations are determined largely by things that teachers and
administrators have little control over: the socio-economic status of
the student body and the proportion of graduates going to college.
Few American employers pay attention to achievement in high
school or school reputations when making hiring selections (Bishop,
1989, 1993; Hollenbeck and Smith, 1984). Consequently, students
357
ARE NATIONAL EXIT E..X...\MINATIONS IMPORTANT, john Bishop
who study hard are not immediately rewarded with higher wage rates.
Their greater competence is not fUlly recognised with higher wage
rates until more than a decade after they graduate. Thus, higher stan-
dards benefit students as a group only after many years, so parents as
a group have a reduced incentive to lobby for higher teacher salaries,
higher standards, and higher school taxes.,
External exams in secondary school subjects change the- sign'aHing
environment. Hiring better teachers and improving the school's sci-
ence laboratories now yields a visible payoff-~ore students passing
the external exams and being admitted to top colleges. School repu-
tations will now tend to reflect student academic performance rather
than the family background of the community or the success of
football and basketball teams.
Hypothesis
5
External exams will...
Cause priorities to shift in favour of achievement in ex-
amination subjects and away from inter-scholastic
sports, band, and other activities intended to make
school fun and entertain the public. Administrators and
school boards will be induced to:
. Improve the school's science laboratories (if science
is an examination subject) and other facilities that
contribute to learning in examination subjects
. Offer additional courses in examination subjects and
scale back offerings outside the core academic pro-
gram
. Increase the share of the school week devoted to
examination subjects (when this is a local decision)
. Lengthen the school day and school year (when this
is a local decision)
. Offer accelerated! enriched math and science courses
. Use specialist teachers to teach examination subjects
. Hire teachers with a thorough background in the
t"ield
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
. Redu~e class size in examination subjects
Give teachers additional preparation time
Pay higher salaries
Spend more per pupil.
.
.
.
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Where students and parents choose their secondary school and
state subsidies follow the student, the incentive effects of CBEEESs
are magnified. In countries that have school choice and a CBEEES,
newspapers typically publish league tables that report examination
results by school. These results have major effects on enrolment ap-
plications the following year. Marginal instructional costs are typically
below state aid per student, so schools at the top of the league table-
often expand (sometimes by bringing in temporary classrooms),
forcing the schools with poor results to shrink and layoff staff.
Hypothesis
6
Extema/exams will...
Induce larger shifts in the priority given academics when
parents are able to choose which school their child attends
and funding follows the student.
Teachers. In the US, 30% of the teachers say they "tee! pressure to give
higher grades than students' work deserves" and "feel pressure to reduce
the difficulty and amount of work you assign" (peter D. JIart Research
Associates, 1994). Under a system of external exams, teachers and local
school administrators lose the option of lowering standards to lower fail-
ure rates and raise self-esteem. Their response will be to strive to prepare
their students for the external exam.
Hypothesis
7
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Extema/exams will...
Induce teachers to:
. Set higher standards
. Assign more homework
. Increase the number of experiments that students do in
science class
. I lave students solve mathematics problems alone
rather than in groups
. Give more quizzes and tests
. Increase their use of other teaching strategies, which
they believe improve exam performance
. Try less hard to entertain students
. Pay less attention to non-academic goals such as self-
esteem, good discipline and low absenteeism.
359
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Some educators argue that external exams can have negative effects
on teaching. It is argued, for €)(ample, that \\preparation for high stakes
tests often emphasises rate memorisation and cramming of students and
drill and practice teaching methods" and that
some kinds of teaching to the test pennits students to do well in
examinations without recotme to higher l~ds of cognitive activity
QMadaus, 1991,p. 7-8).
The assumption of opponents appears to be that the tests developed
by individual teachers for use in their class are better than examinations
developed by the committees of teachers that would have responsibility
for developing state or national examinations. To the contrary, the tests
that teachers presently develop for themselves are generally of very low
quality. The Fleming and Chambers (1983) study of tests developed by
high school teachers using Bloom's taxonomy of instructional objectives
found that
over all grades, 80 per cent of the items on teachers' tests were
constructed to tap the lowest of the taxonomic categories, knowl-
edge (of terms, facts or principles) (Thomas, 1991, p. 14).
Rowher and Thomas (1987) found that in colleges fully 99% of items on
instructor-developed tests in American history required the integration of
ideas, while only 18% of junior high school and 14'10 of senior high
school test items required such integration. Secondary school teachers
test low-level competencies because that is what they teach. Few students
take state-mandated tests in history, so. poor history teaching cannot be
blamed on standardised tests. More evidence is needed on this issue, so
tests are conducted on this hypothesis:
Hypothesis
8
External exams will ...
Cause teachers to fOCllSon teaching facts and definitions,
not the scientific process. Students will conduct fewer ex-
periments in science class and computation will be stressed
in mathematics.
CI3EEE advocates argue to the contrary that well-designed exter-
nal examinations that are graded by teachers will improve instruction.
In May 1996, I interviewed several activists in the Alberta Teachers
Union about the examination system in Alberta Canada. Even
though the umon and these teachers opposed the exams, they uni-
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versally reported that serving on grading committees was ce...a won-
derful professional development activity (Bob, 1996)." Having to
agree on what constituted excellent, good, poor, and failing responses
to essay questions or open-ended math problems resulted in a shar-
ing of perspectives and teaching tips that most found very helpful.
3. Do CBEEESs increase achievement?
A look at the evidence
The hypothesis that CBEEESs improve achievement is tested by com-
paring nations and provinces that do and do not have such systems.
Four different data sets are examined:
1. Science and mathematics achievement of 13 year aids in the 40-
nation Third I nternationoi Math and Science S tJ/t/y
2. The reading literacy of 14 year olds in the Internationa/Association rf the
Evaluation oJEducationoiAchievement's (IEA) ReadingStut/y
3. Science, math and geography scores of 13 year olds on the lnterna-
tiona/Assessment rfEducaliona/ Progress (IAEP) for 16 nations
4. Science :u:d math scores of 13 year aids in nine Canadian provinces.
The theory predicts that CBEEESs influence societal decisions about
education spending, administrator decisions about school priorities,
teacher's decisions about standards and pedagogy, and student decisions
about studying. Much of the ultimate impact of CBEEESs on student
achievement derives from the changes they induce in spending, priorities,
and pedagogy. In this section, the objective is to assess the totaleffect of
CBEEESs on achievement (the sum of all the paths leading from the
CBEEES to student achievement shown in Figure 1). Estimates of the
total effects of CBEEE..Ssare obtained from a reduced form model that
controls for parental socio-economic status, national productivity levels,
and national cultur~d not the endogenous administrator, teacher
and parent behaviours.
Section 4 present.s models of the paths leading out of the CBEEES
box in Figure 1. The relationships between CBEEf:5 and the resources
devoted to K-12 schooling, administrative policies and priorities, and
teacher pedagogy and standards are studied in a 42-nation CToss-section
and in comparisons of Canadian provinces with and 'W1thoutCEEEES.
361
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3.1. Third International Mathematics and Science Study
The Third InternationalMathematics and ScienceStut!Y (TIMSS) provides
1994-95 data for 7th and 8th graders for 40 countries. The 1990-91 IEA
reading study provides data on the literacy of 9th graders in 24 countries.
To determine which TIMSS nations have CBEES, I reviewed compara-
tive education studies, government do"Cuments,and education encyclo-
paedias and interviewed education ministry officials, embassy personnel,
and Cornell graduate students from the country.2 Twenty-tWo national
school systems were classified as having CBEEESs for both subjects in
all parts of the country: Austria, Bulgaria, Columbia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, England, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Japan,
Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Scotland, Sin-
gapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Thailand. France, Iceland, and
Romania had CBEEESs in math but not in science. Australia, Canada,
Germany, Switzerland, and the US had CBEEESs in some prov-
inces/states but not in others. Norway has regular exit examinations in
math, but examines in science only every few years. Latvia had an exter-
nal examination system until very recently, so it was given a .5 on the
CBEEES variable. The countries classified as not having a CBEEES in
either subject were Belgium (Flemish and French systems), Cyprus,
Greece, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Following Madeus and
Kelleghan (1991),the university entrance examinations in Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain, Cyprus and the ACT and SAT in the US were not considered
to be CBEEESs. University entrance exams should have much smaller
incentive effects because students headed for jobs do not take them, and
teachers can avoid responsibility for their students' exam results by ar-
guing that not everyone is college material or that examiners have set an
unreasonably high standard to limit enrolment in higher education.
Sweden was coded as a zero on the CBEEES variable because it
eliminated its high-stakes, cunicu1um-based, external examinations at the
end of secondary school in 1972 (Eckstein and Noah, 1993).Continuous
2 Appendix A of Bishop (1998) provides a bibliography of documents and indi-
viduals consulted when making these classifications. The TIMSS report's infonna-
tion about examination systems does not distinguish between university admissions
exams and curriculum-based exit exams, so its classifications are not useful for this
exercise. In the TIMSS report, the Philippines, for example, is classified as having
external exams, but its exams are university awrussions exams simiJar to the SAT.
South Africa was excluded because its education system was disrupted for many
years by boycotts that were part of the campaign to end apartheid. Ku'W'ait was
excluded due to disruption of its education system by the Gulf War.
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assessment by teachers became the basis for certifying achievement. But
fearing grade inflation, the National Board of Education developed the
multiple choice and short answer norm reference (CentralaProv)subject
exammatlons
to help teachers grade students properly
'n
Teachers must use
them and are not allowed to deviate more than .2 grade points
from the standardised test class means in their final evaluation
(Kreeft 1990, p. 15).
While teacher-awarded grades were supposed to follow a nonnal distri-
bution centred on the class mean on the CentmlaProv,there is contro-
versy about whether these mandates are being followed. In any case, the
effect of students' perfonnance on the CentmlaProv test on their grades is
small. Swedish students I talked to did not perceive the Centra/aProvex-
ams as carrying high stakes for themselves.
Figures 2 and 3 array the 40 TIMSS countries by the science and math
achievement of their 13 year olds. Sweden ranks 14 in science and 19 in
math. The gaps between the vertical grid lines represent one Swedish
grade-level equivalent (GLE)-one-half the difference between 6th and
8th grade TIMSS test score means for Sweden. There are substantial
achievement differentials between nations. In science, only Singapore is
more than 1 GLE ahead of Sweden. Columbia, the Philippines, Lithua-
nia, Romania, and Portugal are more than 2 GLEs behind. In math, Sin-
gapore, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Flemish-speaking Belgium are
more than 1 GLE ahead of Sweden. Columbia, the Philippines, and Iran
are more than 2 GLEs behind. The countries represented by a solid
black bar in the tigures have a CBEEE in the subject. Countries repre-
sented by white squares do not. Note that the countries with a CBEEF.5
in the subject tend to have higher TIMSS scores.
Regression analysis. The mean 8th grade science and math test
scores were regressed on average per capita gross domestic product for
1987-1991 deflated by a purchasing power parity price index, a dummy
for East Asian nation and a dummy for CBEEES.3 Results in Table 1
indicate that test scores are significantly higher in more developed na-
tions, East Asian nations, and in nations with a CBEEES in the subject.
j
TIMSS studied the two grades with the largest number of 13 year aIds. The grade
in the regression was the upper grade of the two studied. In Sweden, Norway, and
Denmark, 7th grade was used because children start school at a later age. In Eng-
land, Scotland, and New Zealand the 9th grade was used because children start
grade 1 a year earlier than in most nations.
363
.
.
. . . . . . . . . . . + + . + + + . . + . . .
.
. .
t9
£
.
.
_
n
f
:
J:
I
JI
~
0
I
:
m
I
~
I
;
:
;
:
,
'
~
i
l 0 Jft m m S" I 2
.
.
0 If: m m :;
-
i
.
2
.
'
I
"
"
"
"
~
r J. :s "
lr
l~
!l
ll
~l
ll
.
.
.
2t
~
.
.
i
n
=
I .
.
. .
!I
I
I
i
n
:
:
r
.
.
:
-
-
:
Z
:
:
c
.
.
=
,
-
-
-
-
"
'
"
.
.
-
J
iI
-
.
f
J1
1.
.
~
.
c
.
I
L
j
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
,
-
f'
do
qs
m
tr
qO
f'
~N
VD
IO
dW
I
SN
Ol
lV
NI
W
VX
H
llX
31
VN
Oi
lV
N
31
1V
~
9£
!.I
t.
~
-
.
.
eo
"""
"
'.
"
"
'"
-
"
"
.'
,.
..
.-
cIr
i::
r
i
AI
;
i
l
s:
.
~
:if
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
.
-
.
eo
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
-
.
.
.
-
i-
"
2-
i
i;o
o:
IJ
!~
.
~
i.It
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.
a-
;r
(() I
ti~
~
Q
f
~
'.
ki'~
lllln
lUh
"
!lU
ll.I
.U
IH
il
0 ..a.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
-
.
-
-
.
.
-
-
.
.
.
.
.
N
.
.
-
-
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
.
Co
t
-
.
.
-
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
-
.
.
.
.
.
-
.
-
-
-
-
.
-
-
.
-
-
.
.
.
-
.
.
.
-
.
.
-
-
-
.
.
.
.
-
.
do
qs
l't
[
u
qo
f'.
LN
V
.L
H
Od
W
I
SN
OU
VN
IW
VX
tl
.
LI
X
3
'IV
N
OI
.L
VN
ffi
IV
. . . , . . . . .. + + . . . . . . , . .
,
_
.
.
.
99
£
+ .
.
"
'
,
.
.
"
,
.
,
'
.
.
,
.
"
.
.
,
.
"
,
.
.
,
"
,
.
.
"
.
.
.
"
.
'
.
.
,
.
,
"
.
.
.
1.
.1
.,
1 0
z
:
I
:
CD
0
I
m
o
o
m
CD
I
I
J
~
m
m
:
J
m
m
"
n
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
"
"
.
.
'
.
.
.
,
.
'
-
-
§"
""
3.
''
'u
.~
!
f
I
'
8
.
"
"
"
m
'
m
-
-
"
.
,
"
.
.
.
.
'
'
'
'
-
-
.
a
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
-
-
.
.
. t .
3" I
)
:
=
;
if
,
"
,
.
.
,
.
,
.
,
.
.
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
'
"
'
'
'
'
.
'
'
J-
''
''
'
:
0_
8 ,
.
(.
e
n
n
l~
H
11
11
.:
::
0
'
i ..1
.
. .
'
1 ... .
'
.
.
1 .. .. .
I
I .... .
1 .
1
[ 1
.
. .
. .
" 1'
.
.
.
J
f
J>
.
,
~
'
,
.
.
.
.
m
.
.
'
.
.
00
'
'
'
00
''
".
m
:
r
.
.
-
-
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
"
11
r
Q" c a ~ en n -" CD :s 2 N it i I. .. I» (Q CD ...
.
(,
.I
.
do
qs
!g
u
qO
['
.l
NV
~(
[O
dW
I
SN
Ol
LV
NI
W
VX
3.
lIX
3:
W
N
Ol
iV
N
ffi
IV
L9
£
f.
ft
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
"
.
"
'.
.
.
'.
.
'.
'.
.
.
.
"
.
.
'.
"
"
"
'.
'.
'.
'.
.
'
'
.
.
i
:;
!.
t
I~
'"
f[~
mm
u
.
.
.
.
.
.
i
1"
1
.
.
.
I
J
~
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
inr
i""uu"
I
! ("
f' 1
2
"
.
en
',
"
.
.
I:J
;:
.
~
;.
.
.
.
,
>
l
I"Q
.
fl ,
-
-
.
.
~
-
~
~
I
if
~
,
.
',
.
,
,
.
o
.J
0
.
.
;..
.
"
.
.
.
lU
UI
I'
-
u
_
.
,
m
nn
'''
''_
'''
',,
,-
"
'-
'u
'
h.
-
"
"
''
''
''
-
-
''
"
,
.
-
~
.
h-
,
-
.
.
-
_
O"
_-
"'O
'm
''
'-
_
'.
.
-
0''
..-
h
"
O_
."h
o.
.
'0_
"
dO
l{s
l£[
uq
o[
'~
NV
D
IO
dW
I
SN
OU
V
N
IW
V
X
3
1l
X
'3
'IV
N
OU
V
N
ffi
fV
ARE NATIONAL EXIT EXAMINA110NS IMPORTANT,]ohn Bishop
Table 1. The effect of curriculum-based external exit ...
Diploma exam Private share Private-share
LT .11
,¥"-""~"-""'-~-'~'-"-' ""-""'-"',._.'-' "'~"
"m~~.-'-_."
~ , -
'.
~_'_'--~'
""_'-"'~'''nTIMSS science-1994
~._'",-,..,--,'~-'
.
8th grade 42.2***
r11~~~_..,..-
-'-' ""W'
(~:?9L
"'.w'Median 33.9**
1~yr:gIQ~
'
J?:.!?9L..
Median 30.1 **
1~Yr.~.()lcjs
"
J?~.~L ,.....
Median 32.3** - 20.6
..~_Y~:..CI'~~ J2.34) L§91
'"''
h-.
Median 27.4* -304*
J~.Y!~..CIIQ!
"
.J~9-91 .. <1~f3?L
TIMSS matbematics-1994
~
,...
"
."
~...~ -~--.,, .."
8th grade
mean
...""''''' -""".
...n
Median
13.yr~()lc!s.,. ..
Median
.J.~.y.r.~..()I.cj~.._._._..
Median
1~y'~~_old~,
-. .''..,.
Median
J::iyr~()lcjs ,
.1E:~r~~..iltg:1.?9.tI
Average, age
~cjlY~~.cj."..__._.
Average, age
~Qj~s!~ ..
Average, age
~dj~~!ecj
..
Average, age
~djusted
<
'-~-"-'~
'''''.¥' ." ,--,,,,~''' ~--'-~.~~'.~~_.,-~
37.3**
J?:5?). .
25.6*
.J1.?~).. .
21.1
..11.:.4!?1... m.~ "--""-,,--,,,
27.7* 18.1
J1.:.~~L ,,-~ 1.~Ol.._...._...__...
19.6
. _.J!:.~?L-
. ~ "-"' '''''''"", .~~_.,._-~..........
.366**
(2:30)..
24.5"**
. m@;Q?J
23.6**
.. .(?:?9.L
22.0"* -24.7
...
(?67) ...{1.46L "',.
._,....--..
17.2**
..(?:J.~J ,....
-216"*
. . .., {?~~) ...
Notes: Grade-level equivalents are about 26 for science and 24 for math and
reading. The TIMSS analysis is based on 39 nations. The analysis of lEA reading
data is based on 24.25 nations. T values are in parentheses under the coefficients.
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."
examinations on science, math, and reading achievement.
Private share Ed. spending-' Per capita GDP East Asia Adj. R2
GT .11 87-91 RUSE
''''''~
>'''''''Y_'---''~~'>'''''''m.¥'.m.
-" 'm'."_'~~"_"""'.'-_"
"._.~~' '.'~V'
19.9
,..C?41,
30.4d* 11.1 .296
.,.J~.?~t .. Lf?7t , ?6~9 ..
37.3"" 18.7 .313-
,,-- . .-.
'"
. _t~:~~L O_~.~L"H3f3.:~.-
15.0* 31.S**'" 33.4 .381
..~1:~4L (:3.01L...~," n .S!ft.- ._~_S.f3....
39.3*** 23.7 .302
@~~Jl__." . JJ.:m ,..~I:?_..
42.2*** 33.5* .342
.,(~JJ5L. .JL??l- ,.;36J..
''''''¥.~-'--'''''''''''¥''''
..., ..
..~.. ~ ~ ,
.
"" '-'~','-"-'--
..
~,"'~-,','.~..<.
.~._-~, m
71.3*
(2.99)
H"_."...(4::~t-
'50.7**'"
(4::~13) ..,.
..., ," ...,
, "
57.8*** .400
."_.i~:~., :3.~.:~..,
66.1*** .460
.._(~:.~1- 36:!....
75.0*"'* .494
J~~1..4:t ~?:~... .
61.S**'" .450
.'
.J:3.~l_. . .:37,1 .
74.8.** .520
._(4:Jt)) ,34:6
r.~_'~ h~~ ~..~.. -,-.
hh. .. ..Umn,....
39.8***
,...
,"."
u.(3..:7?}
.'.-
48.5***
..
"-""'-.""
_.e,"" .. '-_C.'."_.m."'" k4::!).?}....
6.6 48.2H.
1.81J. (4.~¥),..
46.8***
2.1
.J.47t.....-
",,,,,'"u'.....-........
24.2*H
J~ i~l"_...--
23.7***
_j~~g~l " .
27.9*.*
_(~~?;31.-
--0-
29.7***
(4~28)
-21.6* .618
(~,941_.. 1.~&-
-18.6 .604
(~:.~~L_.. .J.E?9--
-11.8 .628
..19.:3)._"_..~_~,4-- ..
- 3.6 .634
J?~LJ?:J...
-~"',...~.._',.
""""'~' w
','-.'-
.~.'--,
- -~"-'''-'.'~~
.
...~
'.
-4.1
. ..t??)....
a) per cent of GDP.
***
indicates the coefficient is significant at the 1% level on a
two-tail test; ** indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5'1'0level on a two-tail
test; * indicates the coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two-tail test
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But the analysis of achievement at a particular grade level may be
biased by differing policies regarding grade retention, school-entry
age, and which grade was chosen for assessment. CBEEESs, for
example, might be associated with high rates of grade retention.] So a
preferable dependent variable is a measure of student achievement at
some fixed age. Rows 3 and 4 of each panel present estimated models
that predict the median test score for each. nation's- 13-year aids
(Beaton et al, 1996a,b,Table 1.5). For countries not in this table, the
13-year-old median was estimated by age-adjusting the 7th and 8th
grade means.2 Switching to the age constant achievement somewhat
reduces the estimated impact of the CBEEES, but the effects remain
statistically significant. Using two-tail t tests, the CBEEES coefficient
has a P = .08 in the mathematics model and a P = .01 in the science
mode\.3 The estimated impacts are substantively important: 1.3 US
grade-level equivalents in science and 1.0 US grade-level equivalents
in math.
One of the ways CBEEESs may improve achievement is by inducing
greater social investments in education. Row 3 presents results of regres-
sions that add the share of GDP spent on education to the standard
mode\. Coefficients on this variable are positive for outcomes and signifi-
cantly so for science. But the estimated impacts of spending are modest.
A one percentage-point increase in the share of GDP devoted to educa-
1 School attendance is not universal at age 13 in some less-developed countries
participating in TIMSS. TIMSS publications do not report age-specific school en-
rollment rates, but they report an indicator that sets a lower bound on age-specific
school enroUment rates-the proportion of the nation's 13 year aIds who were in
one of the two grades tested. Developing countries with rates below 80 were Co-
lumbia (45%), Iran (72%), Portugal (76%), Romania (76%), and Thailand (78%)
(Beaton et al, 1996, Table A3).
2 The Philippines, for example, had a math score mean of 399 in 8th grdde and a
mean of 386 in 7th grade. The mean age of 8th graders was 14; the mean age of
7th graders was 12.9. The math score for 13.5 year olds was estimated by interpo.
lation between 7th and 8th grade means. Math 13.5 = 386 + (399-386)"((13.5-
12.9)/(14-12.9»).
3 Sweden's actual test scores (particularly in reading and science) lie substantially
above the predictions for it generated from model 2. It might be argued that the
Centrala Prov will have effects similar to a CBEEES and that Sweden should thus
be receded as a .5 or a 1 on the exam variable. \Vhen that experiment was tried, R
squares and the size of the CBEE.ES coefficient grew. So reclassifying the C'entrala
Prov as a CBEEES actually strengthens the primary finding of the paper that
CBEEESs raise academic standards.
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tion increases the science achievement of 13 year aids by only one half a
grade-level equivaleht
3.2. The lEA study of reading literacy
The bottom panel in Table 1 prcsents an identical analysis of lEA read-
ing achievement data. To avoid problems of differing school-entry ages
and grdde-retention policies, the age standardised reading scores pro-
vided in Appendix E of Flley (1992) were used in the analysis.Thc' lEA
study dcfined and measured three types of reading literacy-narrative,
expository, and docllffient-and an average of the three scores is the
dependent variable. The specification is the same as that used to study
science and math achievement. Here, the exam variable is an average of
the math and science CBEEES dummy variables used in the analysis of
TIMSS data. The results are similar as well. Diploma exams and per cap-
ita GDP have significant positive effects on reading achievement. Coun-
trieswith largerprivateschool enrolment shares appear, ce/ensparibus,to
have lower reading achievement, though not significantlyso.
3.3. Effect of the size of the private school sector
The hypothesis that a large private school sector instigates a competitive
environment that makes all schools better is tested in the bottom two
rows of each panel. Row 4 presents the results of adding the share of
primary and middle school students who attend private schools to the
model. Adding the private share leaves the coefficients on CBEEES un-
changed and does not improve model fit. The private sector size variablc
has inconsistent and statistically insignific-anteffects on average achieve-
ment levels. In the models of science and reading achievement, the point
estimate is negative. In the math equation, it is positive but tiny. Clearly
there is no linear relationship between the size of the private school sec-
tor and student achievement.
I also tested for a non-linear relationship. This was accomplished
by allowing the slope of the relationship between private sector share
and achievement to shift at some arbitrary kink point (i.e., including a
spline). Two separate slopes were estimated: one for the region from
zero to . t t, the current US private school enrolment share, and one
for the range from .11 to 1.0. The kink point of .1t is above the me-
dian of the variable and slightly below the mean, which is .139. The
coefficients on the lower range are all significantly ncgative. They im-
ply that countries that lack any private schools, such as Sweden, will
tend to have a more than one grade-level equivalent achievement ad-
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vantage over countries such as the US with modest-size private sec-
tors when other things-GDP, Asia, and exam systems-are held
constant. The upper region coefficient from the mathematics regres-
sion is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that the large
size of the private school sector in Belgium, Hong Kong, and the
Netherlands may be one of the reaspns why math achievement is
high in these three countries! .
3.4. The impact of CBEEESs on inequality of achievement
Policy-makers are also interested in knowing if the CBEEES affects the
variance of student achievement and the level. To address that question,
models were estimated that predict the standard deviation of student
achievement for the 39 nations that participated in TIMSS. The specifi-
cation was, with just one exception, the same as that used to predict
achievement levels. To deal with possible distorting effects of floors and
ceilings on the TIMSS achievement scales, the achievement level was
mduded as an independent variable along \\<;th per capita GDP and
dummy variables for East Asia and for a CBEEES. The results are in the
top panel of Table 2. CBEEESs neither increase nor decrease the vari-
ance of student achievement. Per capita GDP and the dummy for East
A~ian nations have no effect either. The achievement level is the only
variable with a statisticalJysignificant relationship with the standard de-
viation of achievement.
4 There are two possible reasons for this non-linear relationshi~ne causal, the
. other not. The causal explanation proposes that a growing private school sector
will weaken support of public schools causing them to be under funded. If there
are no alternatives to public schools, activist parents will "voice" their concern by
running for lyrA president or the school's board of governors. Their pressure, it
has been hypothesized, keeps the schools first class. When private schools are an
option for most parents, the activis ts "exit" and their positive influence on the
quality of the public school may be lost. The only way to avoid this fate is to tie
the fortunes of the two sectors together by requiring students in both sectors to
take the sanle courses and the same exams and by tying the subsidy of private
school student to the subsidy of public school students. This is what Belgium,
J long Kong, and the Netherlands have done and it has resulted in a very large
private sector. The other explanation proposes that unsubsidized private sectors
(such as the one that has captured 11 'Yoof the market in the US) spring up when
the public schools do a poor job. If public schools are of unifonnly high quality,
private schools have no market niche to filL If the nation chooses to fund private
schools 011the Sanle footing as public schools, they end up with over half of the
market and their pressure forces the public schools to become better.
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Table 2. How is science and mathematics achievement differ-
ent in nations withCBEEESs?
CBEEE Log
GDP/pop
1987-91
East
Asia
13 yr. Adj. R2 No.
olds RMSE obs.
achiev.
...'"
"""'-m..
On ...........-..........
Variance of achievement
"fiMS'S science SD-'~-
~ ..
1.5 ' --:r.O~ qV'" Y'::2-"--"~-"~"'-'-'~o7i'~"~'~616
~. .n 40
(Y.~~..1().§.:!)L n.. .. t~?) .J.. .3()Ltp.4}.
. (1.:??L..~(),2 ......
TIMSS mathematics SD 2.8 -3.2 ..2.2 .17*** .529 40
(U~::.so.L'HHHHHHJ~E) ... (1,?!:i) (.55t(§.?()L J?
'H'
.!~~~..~ti()n..~ A!lse!l!l~.~!!t..CJ.r...~d.\l<:~u.()~~.J!r.?~.~!Il~..l 0".""'-
Science, % correct, 4.3 1.4 9.3** .429 15
J~yr:..2~~.(Y~..~~~..=-E)) J!:D).. o i:~?L__oo.. (?:.?~t._. 0 " ~:~? ...
Math,%correct, 15.4." 4.6 14.1** .648 15
~..Y~.,.()!c:I.HI,J~~E =_~L_J!:~l. ... t!~1_()L..j~:4-01'H ..?.9!:i.. .
Geography, % correct 1.8 -2.7 -3.6 .071 20
adjlJ.~!ed (1:'!s.>'
..
J1.28L. (.~?)
~.47 .
Geography, % correct 2.6 -1.9 .039 20
adjusted.
. j1:~>'H('?~>' ~.:?~
Notes: In TIMSS data, US grade-level equivalent:5 are about 26 for science and 24
for math. T values are in parentheses under the coefficients. u" indicates the coef-
ficient is significant at the 1% level on a two-tail test indicates the coefficient is
significant at the 5% level on a two-tail test." indicates the coefficient is sigllificant
at the 10% level on a two-tail test.
3.5 Analysis of the
1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress
Science and mathematics. The 1991 International Assessment if Edu-
cationalProgress (IAEP) is the third data set in which CBEEE effects
can be tested. Fifteen nations are available for the analysis: England,
France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Emilia Romagna/Northem Italy,
Korea, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain, Switzerland,
Taiwan, and the us. Canadian data is analysed separately. Data from
Brazil, Jordan, and Mozambique were not used because of the low
levels of industrialisation. In IAEP, schools were first sampled, then
students within schools. Sampling frames generally excluded separate
schools for special education students and often very small schools as
well. Israel assessed only its Hebrew-speaking schools, The Soviet
Union assessed Russian language schools in 14 of the nation's 15 re-
publics. Switzerland assessed 15 of 26 cantons. A school's likelihood
of selection was roughly in proportion to its estimated number of 13
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year aIds. In most countries, school non-response rates were ex-
tremely low. They were zero in Hungary, Slovenia, Korea, and Tai-
wan and 3% in Israel and the Soviet Union. The countries with high
non-response rates were Switzerland (17%), Emilia Romagna (18%),
Scotland (19%), the US (21%), and England (48%). When sampled
schools declined to participate, an alternate was selected from the
same stratum (IAEP, 1992a,b,c).-Randomsamples of 3~-34 (13 year
aIds) were selected from each school. Half were assigned to the .
mathematics assessment and half assigned to the science assessment.
The average per cent correct (adjusted for guessing) for 13-year-old
students was regressed on the same set of variables as in the analysis
of the TIMSS data.
The results are in the bottom panel of Table 2. For mathematics
the effect of curriculum-based external exams is highly significant and
quite large. Because the US standard deviation was 26.8 percentage
points in mathematics, the CBEEE effect on math was more than
one-half of a US standard deviation or about 2 US grade-level
equivalents. CBEEEs had a smaller non-significant effect on science
achievement. East Asian students scored significantly higher than
students in Europe and North America. Coefficient" on per capita
GDP were positive but not statistically significant.
Geography. Nine of the countries in the IAEP study assessed geog-
raphy as well as mathematics and science. The countries participating in
the geography assessment were Canada, Hungary, Ireland, Korea, Scot-
land, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain, and the US. Canada collected suffi-
cient data to allow valid comparisons between provinces and between
the Anglophone and Francophone school systems of the five provinces
with dual education systems. Some of these provinces have CBEEE."
and others do not, so including the Canadian provincial data in the study
increases the power of our tests for the effects of exams (lAEP, 1992d).
Regressions were estimated that predict country/provincial means
using the same specifications as above. The logarithm of per capita GDP
1987-91 had the ""Tong(a negative) sign, so preferred specification is one
that does not include this variable. In the preferred model, curriculum
based exams has an almost significant effect on geography achievement.
The effect appears ~o be roughly 15% of a US standard deviation. The
Canadian provinces without examination systems do significantly worse
than the provinces that have examinations systems (F for Hyp = 3.9).
These results are consistent with the causal hypotheses previously
presented. But causation is not proved, because other explanations can
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no doubt be proposed. Other sources of variation in curriculum-based
exams must be analysed. Best of all would be studies that hold national
culture constant. Bishop, Moriarty and Mane (1997) have found that
when socio-economic background is held constant, students from New
York state, the only US state with a CBEEES, out perfonn students in
other states on the NAEP math assessment and on the SAT-I. The next
section presents a comparison of math and science achievement of Ca-
nadian students, who live in provinces with curriculum-based diploma
examinations, with comparable students in provinces without such ex-
aminations.
3.6. Comparing Canadian provinces
In 1990-91, the year the IAEP data was being collected, AJberta, British
Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec, and Francophone New Brunswick
had curricUlum-based provincial examinations in English, French,
mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics during the senior year of
high school. These ex2mSaccounted for 50% of that year's final grade in
ld,lberta, Newfoundland, and Quebec and 40% in British Columbia..The
other provinces did not have curriculum-based provincial external exit
examinations in 1990-91 (White, 1993).Ontario eliminated them in 1967,
Manitoba in 1970, and Nova Scotia in 1972 Anglophone New Bruns-
wick had provincial exams in language arts and mathematics but exam
grades were not reported on transcripts or counted in tlnal course grades.
Canadian provincial exams are medium stJkes, not high stakes tests. They
influence grades but passing the examination is not essential for gradua-
tion. Employers appear uninterested in exam scores. Job application
forms do not request that applicants report exam scores or grades.
The principals of schools sampled by IAEP completed questionnaires
that describe school policies, school resources, and the qualitications of
8th grade mathematics and science teachers. Students were asked about
books in the home, numher of siblings, language spoken at home, hours
of TV, hours doing homework, pleasure reading, watching science pro-
grams on TIT, parental oversight of school work, and teaching methods
of teachers.
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Table 3. Effects of Canadian provincial diploma exams...
Diploma Religious Independent Independent
exam school religious non-
board school sectarian
school
-'.'~---"'-~~''''._~--'''''''''=V_~''''."",..~"",,"-=-,
, ,.,.:~,-> ,..,.,.,
Mathematics ,
y~-,-.,.,-~-<_',="...<._."--_V_""","" ~
"""._,,~._.".-.~.'-,,'-'-"'''''-:_-~''''''__''''''''h'' H,'..''''~'-''-''''''
.062***
2
. .(~.~1) .
.041*** """-"'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''"''W'''
.
(~.:3Q)
'mm.m ..".m. . ... . . ...
.035*** -.041*** .149*** .091***
.J4:ZQL.. ...(?:??l {~~f36J. (3.~~L. .
4 .051*** -.048*** .085*** .061 ***
_.. , m.j?~8L l?:~,;3).. ~4?}.. .J?~~L.....
5 .049*** -.058*** .085*** .059***
~.- w~wJ!.:.1.1J_m..1!,:?;iL.. .__11~.!:i1L .- _.(?&11..-
6 .039*** -.046*** .066*** .024***
,.,-,, ~...J!:i~?~~ J2:'?§L___~@:~_..,, 1U~1 .
Science
3
-",~,'-~',_N~,,-,"M- ..,", ~~.., ,..~..'...''''--'''''W_''''~'-'--''''''''''''''--''''.'~''''''-"~'''_,---",'"->,-""""",,,''.'.'.'.'~---' '-'.', ,..''''''~-''''''"''
.035***
m
(~.~()!})
.026***
qj~:!5?).m
... ' . .
.qm. m
.025*** -.041*** .032* .044**
(~..1Q)__J?X?L. .J1:~?}.. J?:;3,§L~..
.026*** -.029*** -.017 .012
"'-~ (5.J2Jq". (5'I:I8.L o:! 1:11 L:I?L.. .
.027*** -.040*** -.020 .011
(§J.9> (f:),'!l3.t l~..,~.!:Il L:f:>.E31..
6 .009 -.029*** -.052*** -.015
-, ..." , j2:§gL " {4.~g~ 1~;~ ,., j,.,-f3§2 .
.~ri_nci~~w~E?~l'!~.b.~~~!~~ , , , ""' ...
Absenteeism .14*** .00 -.42*** -.35**
m(~:.14) ( .01) .(~,~11 . (?A1)q
.017 -.13** -.34*** -.16
L1()) (?,??L . . (2:71:11... (1J 5)
1
2
3
4
5
Discipline
Notes:The school problem indexes range from 0 ="no problem" to 3 for "seri.
ous". The means (standard deviations) were .78 (SD=.72) for discipline and .82
(SD=.77) for absenteeism.
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... and school governance on student achievement.
Computers, School Inputs, Adj..r
calculators policies, teacher
qualifications,
homework
~, ~"_"Y"",'~___''''''''''1C,,,,,
, ,~--~._.,.,
Elementary Books, size, sibs,
K-11, different home
French language
.0914
.1482
.,-,, ,--~_., ~
x .3291
~-<~_.-'._,'~~'-'-_'_'-'A.
.3606
x .3717
---,,,.,_""-__A""__'_"---W"""""""-"-'-~-'--"'W'--='~---',-~_'N' '''''--''''-'_,,"'_A__A_'''''''''W,
x .1029
.1308
.3230
~~~~.,~~~ ~.." ~
"",~~"_,,,,y,,,,,,,~,--",,,_-'_""_'--"""".v_"
"~"_'~"'~."'_.~-"'-_v.''',',~'_'_-''A,.-.y.''''X X X
.
'_"
Y.~-Y".'_~.',..,,.."'_N.-.'.~'-'-Y
.3316
X X X x .3592
",_""'"...n,..,.",'''''.',-'''.''_.-W'-~-~-.~''''''A''''' "A'~~-'~'..''<~.._~
~., .
.
".'~
...~'.' '.w
n' "''''~'-'---~,-'-'-'-',"~''''--'
~~.'.~
'A~
x .1312
x x .0795
Column 8 variables are per cent of ~tudents who have a computer and per cent
who have a calculator. The school policy variables include: hour.:; of TV, home-
work, specialist teachers, teacher majored in ~ubiect taught, hours of science class,
science lahs, class size, preparation time, teacher experience, and tracking.
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The effect of curriculum-based provincial e..'Citexams taken by
12th graders on achievement of Canadian 13 year aIds was examined
by estimating models that predict achievement using schools as ob-
servations. The data set comprises 1362 Canadian schools. The de-
pendent variable is the school-mean, per cent correct with adjust-
ments for guessing. It is defmed as the (number of correct answers
minus .25 times the number-of answered questions)"'aH divided by .75
times the number of items on the test. Adjusted for guessing, stu-
dents achieved an average of 47.2% in math and 57.3% in science.
The standard deviation across Canadian 13 year aids is 24 points for
the math score and 20 points for the science score.
Row 1 in the top two panels of Table 3 presents simple regressions
that contain no controls for school characteristics. Row 1 tells us that
students in provinces with exam systems scored 6.2 points higher in
math and 3.5 points higher in science. Adding controls for school type
(school includes elementary grades, school includes K-llth grade, Fran-
cophone schoo~ in row 2 lowers the exam effect to 4.1 points for math
and 2.6 points for science. Adding additional controls for three types of
school, governorship in row 3 lowers the exam effect to 3.5 points for
math and 2.5 points for science.
Now let us examine what happens in row 4 when controls arc added
for the demographic background of the school's student body-school
means for books at home, number of siblings, and proportion of stu-
dents whose home language is different from the language of instruction
and size of the school. Here, schools in exam provinces are 5.1 points
higher in math and 2.6 points higher in science. The variables added to
the model in rows 5 and 6 are hypothesised to be influenced by the ex-
istence of external exams. So row 4 presents our best estimate of the total
impact (including indirect effects) of having a provincial exam in the
subject at the end of secondary school on lAEP test scores at age 13.
The effect of provincial exams is about one-half of a US grade-level
equivalent.
Gains in mean achievement generated by exam systems do not come
at the expense of greater inequality. Rxam provinces have less variability
of achievement across schools. The variance of school-mean science
achievement is small.crin Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec than in
any other pro'~nce. For math achievement, the variance was lowest in
New Brunswick, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Alberta.
Regressions predicting the standard de,,-iation of achievement among
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students at a school were run and within-school standard deviations for
science achievement are smaller in exam provinces (Bishop, 1998).
Is the exam effect causal? One possible sceptical response to a
causal interpretation of these findings is to point out that omitted vari-
ables and/or selection effects may be biasing the coefficient on the
CBEEES indicator variable. Maybe the people of Albeffil, British Co-
lumbia, Newfoundland, Quebec, and Francophone New Brunswick (the.
provinces with exam systems) place higher priority on education than .the
rest of the narion.s Maybe this trait also results in greater political support
for examination systems. If so, we would expect that schools in the exam
provinces should be better than schools in other provinces along other
dimensions such as discipline and absenteeism, not just by academic cri-
teria. But that's not the case. Exam systems induce students and schools
to redirectresources and attention to learning/teaching exam subjects and
away from the achievement of other goals such as low absenteeism, good
discipline, and lots of computers. lhese competing hypotheses are evalu-
ated in the bottom panel of Table 3. Contrary to the "provinejal taste for
education" hypothesis, principals did not report significantly fewer disci-
pline problems and were significantly more likely to report absenteeism
problems.
Adding endogenous student behaviour and school-policy vari-
ables. Row 5 of the top two panels has two additional control vari-
ables--calculator availability and computer use. Having a calculator at
home and using computers for school work is associated with higher
math achievement but not higher science achievement. Including these
variables in the model has little effect on the CBEEES coefficient. The
models presented in row 6 of each panel add a full set of endogenous
school policy, school input, and student behaviour variables (see table
notes for list). So they provide a test of whether CBEEr.:ss have direct
effects on achievement when endogenous school policies and inputs,
S This will seem like a strange idea to people who know Canada. Except for 1\J-
berta and British Columbia, these provinces have little in common. Historically
they do not seem to have valued education more than the rest of Canada. Adult
literacy is lower on average in these four provinces than in the rest of Canada
Oones, 1993). Newfoundland is quite poor and has significantly lower levels of
adult literacy than the rest of Canada. The adult literacy study placed Quehec in
the middle of the pack along with Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. Two
of the top four pro~'inces with respect to adult literacy have exam systems and two
do not. Saskatchewan is number one when it comes to adult literacy, yet its 13 year
olds lag substantially berund students from Alberta 'and British Columhia in
mathematics and science.
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homework assignments, and TV watching are all held constlnt. For sci-
ence, the CBEEES coefficient is still positive, but it is very small and no
longer statisticallysignificant Apparently, just about all of the effects of
CBEEESs on science learning operate through school policies and indi-
cators of student time allocation (hours doing homework and hours
watching 1V). But for math, there is ,a substantial and significant direct
effect of CBEEESs on math achievement even when sttJdmt time aLlo~
cationisheldconstant. .
3.7. Effects of Sweden's elimination of exit examinations
Still another way to assess the impact of examination systems is to study
the effects of eliminating them. Spain, Portugal, Latvia, Sweden, and
some Canadian provinces have ended examination systems, but only for
Sweden is their trend data that spans the period of change. Conse-
quently, Sweden's elimination of exit exams in the early 1970s is poten-
tiallyvery instructive.
But Sweden not only ended its exit examHt also established new
rules for selecting applicants for university. Upper secondary students
pursue specialisedlines of study beginning in 10th grade. Universities had
traditionally admitted recent graduates of the academic lines of study in
upper secondary school that had durations of three years. Reforms in-
troduced in the 1970s changed the rules.governing competition for uni-
versity places to favour those who had worked a few years after graduat-
ing £rom secondary school (Rehn and Helveg Peterson, 1980, p. 150).
This encouraged many secondary school graduates to postpone entry
into higher education to accumulate enough work points to gain admis-
sion to preferred educarional programs. Partly for this reason and partly
because many nurses decided to return to school to become physicians,
entrants to the study of medicine, for example, had an average <Jgeof 30
in 1977and 1978 (Rehn and Helveg Peterson, 1980, p. 154).
In addition, universitieswere not allowed to give preference to secon-
dary school graduates who had pursued the more difficult longer dura-
tion academic lines of study in upper secondary school. If one-third of all
applicants to university had pursued a two-year vocational line of study,
the universities and colleges were required to admit one-third of their
entering class £rom this group. This me-ant that a given student's chances
of being admitted to popular majors in university were generally higher if
the student pursued a less-demanding, shorter-dumrion, vocational line
of study. As a result, natur.ll science, the toughest secondary school ma-
jor, was very easy to get into during the autumn of 1978. Ninety-three
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per cent of those who selected it as a first choice were admitted. For
those who wanted to enter a two-year vocarional line in secondary
school, only 460ft,were admitted to their fIrst-choice program.
These changes in secondary school examinarions and university
admissions policies appear to have caused a decline in the number of
Swedish upper secondary students taking rigorous courses in mathe-
marics and science during the 1970s.
Mathematics at graduation. Eight countries participated in the First
InternationalMathematics5tut!Yin 1964 and its replication in 1982 (see Fig-
ure 4). The proportion of Swedish 18 year olds taking college-prep
mathematics in the final year of secondary school fell from 16% to 12%.
This more selected group of students scored onIy slightly higher on the
anchor items that appeared in both assessments. Finns, by contrast, si-
multaneously increased the proportion of the age cohort taking college-
prep mathematics from 7% to 15% and signifIcantly improved their
mean scores (Husen, 1967;Robitaille and Garden, 1989).
Science at graduation. The proportion of Swedish 18 yl.'arolds in
academic lines of study that were given the lEA science exam fell from
45% to 28% between 1970 and 1983. This much smaller and surely more
able group of Swedish students only slightly improved their position
relative to England (see Figure 5).6 Finland, by contrast, increased the
proportion of the age cohort assessed in science from 21% to 41% and
simultaneously improved its score relative to Enghnd. Other countries-
Australia, ltaly--had declines in relative test scores, but they were associ-
ated with large increases in the proportion of 18 year aids in the aca-
demic lines of study that were tested. Hungary was the only other coun-
try to reduce the share of 18 year olds that participated in the 1f:<:Asci-
6 The data necessary to measure changes in absolute levels of achievement be-
tween the Pir.rt and the Second Tntemolional Sciena Stlldies arc not available. But com-
parisons of achievement relative to that of other countries are possible and are
presented in Figure 5. The zero point on the scale for each year was chosen to be
the average performance for that year of the English students preparing for A-level
exams. England was selected for this standardization role because there was no
change in the proportion of its 19-year-old age cohort, who were in the sample
frame for the IE.!\. science study. The standard deviation used as the metric meas-
ures individual variance for pooled data on 14 year olds from 11 (14 in 19113)in-
dustrialir.ed countries. The vectors describe how a nation's scores and participation
rates changed relative to England. The 1983 study reports separate means for non-
specialists (e.g., majors in economics and languages) and for students specializing
in science. These two figures were averaged using the shares of the age cohort,
who pursue these two courses of study, as weights (postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992,
p. 6, 74).
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ence exam and it experienced a substantial increase in relative test scores
(Comber and Keeves, 1973, p. 168; Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, p. 74).
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4. Is parent, administrator, and teacher behavio~r
different in the presence CBEEESs?
A look at the evidence
Are the teachers, school administrators, and parents in nations and
provinces with CBEEESs behaving differently from their counterparts in
nations and provinces that lack a CBEEES? This will be examined by
estimating models that predict mean levels of these behaviours in a sam-
ple of 42 nations most of whom participated in TIMSS and in IAEP data
on a sample of 1360 Canadian middle schools. The cross-section analysis
of schooling inputs and indicators of student effort in 42 nations em-
ploys the same specification as that used in the cross-section analysis of
TIMSS data on student achievement. It contains three variables: per cap-
ita GDP, a dummy variable for East Asia, and a dummy variable for
CBEEES. Results are in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
The model that tested for the effects of CBEEESs in Canadian data
was identical to the one presented in row 4 of Table 3. It contains 11
variables:
. Logarithm of the mean number of books in the home
. The mean number of siblings
. The proportion of the school's students whose home languagewas
different from the language of instruction
. LogMithm of the number of students per grade in the school
. Dummies for schools run by a locally elected Catholic (or Protestant)
school board
. Independent secular and non-secular schools
. Schools with primary grades
. Schools that include allgrades (K-12) in one building
. French speaking schools
. A dummy for EXAMprovince.
Results are presented in Table 7.
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Table 4. How is teacher and student behaviour different in
nations with CBEEESs?
CBEEE LogGDPIpop. East Adj. R< No.
1987-91 Asia RMSE obs.
~,--,-,~--",,
'~'-~'~"""W""h' -"'-'-""'~~'._-".~"-""""'-"'-""""'.~"h"'
~¥. ~.. . . .
-'--"""' "' '~Public investment in education
.m..
n.."
...
"'""'.
..."
... ..h... n,.
.."
''''''..
'.".m..,.. ..." . " "'h'-"'~
'h
.....
% GDP spent on .24' .55** - .86** .257 41
~~-':J.~~igr.' ... L!J_1J {?:.?!t_..,J_?:~?L. .:?~: .
Teacher qualifications 1.53*** .70** -.18 .304 42
.LI).~ex t~.:~..Q) ,{g:5~1- ,__L.39J 1~..
% salary advantage of 30.6* 8.6 10.0 .107 17
lower secondary (2.03) ( .26) ( .40) 23.7
teachers/all workers
o;.;-saiaryadVaiitageof"" . .,'34X-' 5.1' .---"T2:i"'=:019'17
upper secondary (1.64) ( .11) ( .36) 33.2
teachers/all workers
,,,,,,,,,~' ~..m
, '~'..~_~..,..A'_,,_,,,,,,",~"~...onon~-'.o.~-_.
"0Teacher attitudes
00.0
""",,,"O"'_"m''''''~'''''','''''''''''o~o "
'',,,,,_,,,o,,,,,-,,,.h'O"'O_., ,.~,_"h..~...,.
"m.n~' u
~",-,, .
"'~,.~~.
.~,..-o_.~.....
Teacher perception of - 6.1* -5.3** 1.1 .155 25
!!!~!ive"~13:t!!~-1-10~~>._"..~J.1.:~~t>_..~_t2:J!!L .__L?3) u..§:?.!L.. .._--
Society appreciates my
- 5.7 6.9 37.5** .117 27
work science teacher, (.60) (.96) (2.51) 19.1
'Yoy~s
..
P"
.p~~ m_"p,.._,-
Would stay if teacher had - 10.7* - 5.0 1.5 .063 27
opportunity to leave, (1.97) (1.20) ( .18) 11.0
'Y°.Y~~. .- "-'-"'.
Student time use
. 0..."" m",,"m...,.u '" ... "'''..h'''''' '"mOhO..'''''
,
0....
Homework in other sub- - 1.68** -2.03***
j~~J~~~r!3."~~~~)_m_.' ._.J?~.1_~1.. J~~!l ..
TV and computer games 2.47** 1.1
J~g.!:!.~~y.'~~~l
---'-- ---
__(?:Q~L .... .J1:?3L-
Playing or talking with 3.12** 2.14***
f~iel)d~(b()ur~\\Ieek)
.
(2.t)4) (2.68)
Playing sports -.33 .75*
(~~~~\\It3~k) .. ...(,~?)..
-< 1:~?t- ...Reading for pleasure .05 -.20***
(hours/week) ..t:~t ..(4:':1-5)
-
'."'
'.m.,,,' ,"m u.
1.17
(1.:~.1J
-.90
. .
(
.65L.
-5.39**"
(3:971. .
-3.65***
..J?~??t
.06
.81
.279 37
1.76
.054 38
2.75
,'m ~.-~'-~ '-
.354 38
2.70
. .
Y"'''-''_.'.='.''." "0
-_.~_..
.509 38
1.31
.366 38
.15
Noles:
***
indicates the coefficient is significant at the 1% level on a two-tail test.
**
indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two-tail test. .. indi-
cates the coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two-tail test.
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Table 5. How is science teaching different In
nations with CBEEESs?
CBEEE Log GDP/ East Adj. R2 No.
..
"'"
, , , ,P~P.:!?!I?~9! ~i.~_.!!.~~!?.ybs:.
Memorisation necessary to -13.4** -4.3 29.1*** .292 36
,<!9.~I,lJn.~~~I1~ j?':~1),_.. t,~~1 ,(~:.~Zl.14:~__- .
Hard work necessary to do -3.5 -.7 6.3* .028 36
~ell i.I1~~I1~i:I"." .,..
" """'0'"
(1.:.~
",
(:~J ".i1.:~~l.,. ".,~: ?m~m
"Natural talent necessary to 11.2* -7.1 * 11.4 .250 36
<:t()~,11i!:l~c.i~I1~..
'" '"
.".-
,J?:()?l
.m..O.:Z1J.
'"
(1.~) ,
"..
(1~J) .,.,
m
"m
,
Hrs. teachers work outside .2 .07 11.8 -.017 36
.~~~I.~g.l~nL.,_m...,..,.t.~t... ., t1~t J1.:~t_J~?~
'"
",.
Hours meeting/tutoring stu- .42*** -.10 .50*** .420 36
.dent~.3lfter ~!l~,t:~i.en~ ...{:3:QQt J:~~1 ,(2.80) 1§, .
Hours preparing or grading -.33 -.04 .02 -.034 36
,~~nc~te~~ , (L~Ql, ,(,?Ql., ... tQ.Il.__~:~., ,-
Hours reading and grading .22 .023 .64** .162 36
~i.~I1c.~~':'<:t~l1tw.ork m._('~~L w {1,:37)... (?,:?~L§.6
Frequency of student -.04 -.27*** .03 .293 34
~E:!Ii.~nil1.9,!Il~~~il1~iE:!"~~ (:4~)., (4.g8) ,J,:3.1J , "?O~,,,...,.._,..,
Hrs. science homework -.09 -.18* -.06 .050 34
~gnE:l<:t!~E:!~~Y!E:!Il~~E:!~mt??), ",f?,Q11. ,,{:421.,285
Hrs. science homework -.88* -2.1*** .39 .504 37
..q()D~E:lE:I!<~~!J<:tE:lI1!~E:!P()rt_hl!:~:3L.(6.:??L ,.J"fi.fJL, ..J :14",
% gen. science students do 26.8** 23.5*** 6.5 .370 21
.E:I~pe~,,!,.e_nl~,p~E:!tty(>ftE!I1-+:." {?~!)91,,(~:!~L.
",
-_t~?t,J]:4,_"__..
% gen. science students -.5 -11.6** -.6 .209 20
wh.Q.!~E!.science t9~L, J2..?4L .t,t11
','
~.8......--
[\'ores: **" indicates the coefficient is significant at the 1% level on a two-tail test.
**
indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two-tail test. .. indi-
cates the coefficient is significant at the 10'% level on a two-tail test
385
ARE NATIONAL EXIT EXAMINATIONS IMPORTANT, John Bishop
Table 6. How is mathematics teaching different in
nations with CBEEESs?
CBEEE Log GDP!
pop. 1987-91
East
Asia
Ad; R2 No.
RMSE obs
'Mem'orisation"necessary to'dO-"--=-4:!~""wo'-'-:3.6-"'--f6~(r--:~016 ... 37
\Vt31,I.II1I!1~tt:'.
... .00 '.. 000000 .J!:i;3L.mo...t?I?Lm .~ J!:~L..,...?,!.:?..,.,.
Hard work necessary to do well -2.0 -.8 3.7 -.045 37,
.i.I1_.'!I~!' ,J~L , ..J:~~J... .,....(I,.Q.gL._6~,_m,..
.-
Natural talent necessary to do 8.3 -9.2 11.1 .212 37
!"~!.!I1_':!!~t:' ,-_.,.- .,._D~.~!l.,Jg,E) ,J!:.~L" _!,~,L_.._-
Hrs.lwk. math teachers work 1.1 .15 .21 -.033 36
(;)':I~i~~.h.~!h.2':1~m'. ,(1.25).. ..J:?.;>' . .(.?1)
. .. ..2,0 .
Hrs./wk. meeting/tutoring stu- .34* -.13 .39* .164 36
.den~_!i.ft~! schoo.l,.rT1~tI1_" l!.I.4L JfJ1L "J!,!_~L.__,1§'.--,...-
Hrs.lwk. preparing or gradIng -.23 -.11 -.23 -.034 36
mat~t~ts. , ~~~Lm. t??L._,..J!?1 ,E>,~._--
HrsJwk. reading and grading .31 .22 .42 .018 36
mat,hstude.nt!i' wo.~ ...,.,
"'.
,t~81...
.'"
.(1,()(».
... O,J.~) !.:~, ., ,'....
Frequency of student reasoning -12.6* -.13.8*** 2.6 .161 34
,ta~ks il1_l'I'Il!th
... ..
"'.
00 O:~~L . (?,~~L J~~L.., !.?;?_..._...-
Hrs.lwk. of math homework -.07 -.45"* .05 .151 38
~~ig!'~!>.Yt~gt:'.~r._.,... , t~?J j~..Q?t U.~l._:~__---
Hrs.lwk.math homework done, -1.16" -1.84*** .81 .381 37
~!U~£!!:1t~~r,:t '.' . ...",j?:!,~,L, .(4:~..!L ,..,.J1,?fJLm..1.,?E>
Teacher teaches entire class -6,0 -10.4** 10.5 .15938
,...
..00' ...'
""""""'00"""'"
00' ..,
'00'
(1:1()L...J?.?1J..,J1(),!:iL
..1!,E>!'1..
% quiz or test used pretty often+ -20.2" -2.2 6.5 ,082 38
~""..","~_J?:~~t"_h ..l~~.L J.?.Q) .~.8.:~L._.,..
% math students who like math -1.3 -2.1 -.4 -.070 38
.. --.,.. ,(:~L, (:?!i).._J.~l ..,9.3
Notes: *n indicatcs the coefficient is significant at the 1% level on a two. tail test.
*. indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two-tail test,
*
indi-
cates the coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two-tail test.
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Table 7. Effects of Canadian diploma exams on...
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... administrator, teacher and parent behaviour.
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.084
struction, logarithm of the number of students per grade in the school, and dum-
mies for schools run by a locally elected Catholic (or Protestant) school board,
independent secular and non-secular schools, schools with primary grades, schools
that include all grades in one building, and French speaking school.
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The next section is organised around the hypotheses set forth in Sec-
tion 2. I begin by examining hypothesis 5--the nnpact of CBEEF-Ss
and per capita GDP on indicators of school quality, such as spending,
class size, teacher salaries, and qualifications (X in the theory in Bishop,
1996). I then turn to issues of teacher pedagogy-hypotheses 7 and ~
indicators of X and E in our theory. The section concludes with an analy-
sis of how student and parental attitudes and behaviour are affected by ,-
per capita GDP and CBEEESs.
4.1. Education spending, teacher qualifications, and salaries:
hypothesis 5.F to 5-K
The analysis of international cross-section data on spending and teacher
qualifications presented in the top panel of Table 4 supports the hy-
pothesis that rich countries will buy higher-quality schooling inputs
(more X) than poor countries. More developed countries invest a larger
share ofGDP in K-12 education and also set higher minimum qualifica-
tions for entry into secondary school teaching jobs. Schools serving
wealthier communities in Canada are more likely to have their teachers
specialise in teaching one subject and are more likelyto hire math teach-
ers who studied the subject in university.
Contrary to our hypothesis, CBEEES nations do not spend signifi-
cantly more on K-12 schooling (see row 1 of Table 4) and \vithin Can-
ada, class sizes are not smaller and time allowed for preparing lessons is
not greater in CBEEES provinces (see the first panel of Table 7). But
indicators of teacher quality such as "having studied the subject in univer-
sity," 8th grade teachers being specialists in teaching their subject (rows
1-4 of Table 7), and the minimum qualifications tor becoming a secon-
dary school teacher are all significantly higher in CBEEF,S provinces and
nations. There is also evidence from a cross-section analysis of 17 ad-
vanced countries that relative pay levels are higher for secondary school
teachers in CBEEES countries (see rows 3 and 4 of Table 4). But the
higher pay has not resulted in teachers becoming more satisfied with
their status in society. Teachers in CBI:illE..~nations perceived them-
selves to have lower relative status and were significantly more likely to
report wanting to leave the profession if an opportunity came along (see
the second panel of Table 4). In addition, there is no tendency in the
Canadian data for the teaching profession in CBEEP's provinces to have
a higher average experience level. This suggests the possIbility that e.xit
rAtes from the profession may be hih>herin CBEEES nations. \Vhy are
better-paid teachers less satistied? Possibly because teachers who arc part
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of a CBEEE system lose the ability to adjust their expectations for stu-
dents to' their own ability to teach the material. Students learn more, but
teachers work harder and are under much greater stress because their
'success' or 'lack of success' as teachers is now more visible to others.
This in turn helps explain why salaries are higher. Not only are more
qualified teachers needed, they must receive extra compensation for the
negative non-pecuniary characteristics (stress) of their job.
4.2 The quaJity of physical faciJities: hypothesis 5-A
Our theory predicts that facilities that are not believed to directly im-
prove learning in externally examined subjects will not be better in
CBEEES provinces. I would put athletic facilities, computers, and li-
braries in this category. Facilities that are essential for high-quality in-
struction in examination subjects, such as science laboratories, will be
better in the presence of a CBEERS system' The analysis of Canadian
data supports this hypothesis. Science labs are significantly better in
CBEEES provinces. But library books and computers are no more
prevalent in CBEEES provinces than in other provinces.
4.3. Instructional hours: hypothesis 5-B and 5-C
When local school administrators have discretion over the amount of
instruction time that is allocated to examination subjects, our theory pre-
dicts a CBEEES will induce them to allocate a more time to examination
subjects. It is not clear whether the extra time will be obtained by ex-
tending the school day or by reducing time spent in study halls and sub-
jects that are not externally examined. The analysisof Canadian data sup-
ports this hypothesis. Scheduled hours of instruction were 8% higher in
CBEEES provinces for mathematics and 5% higher for science. Total
hours in the school year did not increase, so it appears the extra math
and science instruction came at the expense of something else (see row 5
and 6 of Table 7).
4.4. Teacher pedagogy: hypotheses 7 and 8
Some educators worry that external examinations will lower the qual-
ity of instruction. The fear is that science teachers will be induced to
focus on facts and ddinitions--not the scientific process. The dis-
7 In addition, language labs are hypothesized to be better when listening and
speaking skills are an important part of the external examination.
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covery approach to teaching science--with students learning from
experiments they conduct them!:elve!:-will be de-ernphasised. In
mathematics, computation will be emphasised to the exclusion of
more advanced topics. Finally, students will start believing that doing
well in t.he subject depends on "memo rising the textbook and class
notes." The results of testing these hypotheses are in Tables 5 and 6
and in the second panel of Table 7.
The analysis ofl1MSS dati found, to the contrary, that students were
1m likelYto believe that memorisation was necessary to learn math and
science in CBEEES nations. The difference was Stitistically significant
for science. Teachers were signzjicantfy more likelY to have students do ex-
periments in c\2ss. The grL'ateruse of experiments to teach science was
also found in the analysis of Canadian data. Teachers in CBEEES na-
tions reported a significantlylower frequency of students doing reasoning
tasks in math but not in science. In math, the emphasis placed on com-
putition of whole numbers by 8th grade teachers was significantly lower
in Canadian provinces with CBEEESs. Tht:re were no differences be-
tween provinces in the amount of time students spent working in groups
to solve math problems or in the time spent doing math problems on
their own. The overall conclusion from these comparisons is a resound-
ing rejection of hypothesis 8. There is no evidence that the prospect of
an extcrnal examination toward thc end of secondary school causes the
quality of instruction to decline in 8th grade. Along several dimensions
there were no significant differences in pedagogy. Where CBEEESs had
a Stitistically significant relationship with an indicator of pedagogy, the
quality of instruction was, in every case but onc, higher in the CBEEES
nations / provinces.
According to the Effictive Schoolsliterature, frequent quizzes and tests is
one of the traits of effective schools. This leads one to predict that
teachers would give quizzes and tests more frequently in CBEJ-<::ESna-
tions and provinces. The Canadian dati support this hypothesis, but the
TlMSS data do not. Teachers in countries with CBEEESs spend about
the same amount of time "preparing and grading tests" and "reading and
grading student work" as teachers in countries ",;thout a CBEEES. Stu-
dents report they are given fewer tests in CBEEES nations. The only
significant difference in the allocation of teacher time was the finding
that teachers in CBEEES nations spent considerably more time meeting
with and tutoring students.
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4.5. Student effort-homework versus TV and hanging out:
hypothesis 7-B
The theory in Bishop (19%) could not sign the relationship between na-
tional wealth/productivitY and student effort. But the empirical findings
are unambiguous. Less homework is assigned in rich countries and a lot
less is done. A doubling of GDP per capIta reduces homework done by
4.2 hours per week or about"one-third and increases time talking with
fuends, watching lV, or engaging in sports by 2.8 hours/week. Within
Canada, students at schools that serve wealthier communities watch sig-
nificantly less lV but tend to spend slightly less time (p=.22 on a 2 tail
test) doing homework.
Our theory predicts that students will be expected to (and wilQwork
harder when they face a CBEEES in the future. There is strong support
for this hypothesis in the Canadian data. Students in CBEEf<..:sprovinces
spent significantlymore time doing homework and significantlyless time
watching lV. But in the 'TIMSS analysis, teachers in nations with a
CBEEES did not assign more homework than teachers in other nations.
Students in CBEEES nations reported doing /css homework. In fact,
when the differences on all three homework variables are added to-
gether, students in CREEES nations say they spend about 4 fewer hours
a week doing homework, a reduction of about one-third relative to the
international me-an. They also reported spending an extra 5.6 hours a
week watching lV, playing video games, and being with fuends. There
were no differences in time spent playing sports. Apparently, the image
of the over-worked Japanese student preparing for examination hell does
not characterise most CBEEES nations, at least not in 7th and 8th grade.
This finding suggests a need to revise the theory. One place where
a revision may be needed is the assumption that teachers do not use
direct measures of student effort such as homL'Work assignments
turned in as part of their grading formula. There might be two kinds
of student effort-one invisible to teachers and the other visible to
teachers and therefore part of the teacher's grade. When a CBEEE
becomes the only signal of student achievement, the teachers might
no longer be able to induce students to hand in long homework as-
signments. Under this assumption, a CBEEES might increase invisi-
ble student effort while simultaneously decreasing visible student ef-
fort. This did not happen in Canada because the external exam re-
sults were only a part of the final grade. TIMSS has data on how
teachers evaluate students so it should be possible to investigate this
hypothesis.
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4.6. The hypothesised damaging effects of
external rewards tied to external exams: hypothesis 4
Critics of externally set curriculum-based examinations predict that the
exams will cause students to avoid learning activities that do not enhance
exam scores. This hypothesis was operationalised by tL'Stingwhether
exam systems were associated with less reading for pleasure, less watching
of science programs, such as NOv'A and Nature, and fewer students
having positive attitudes toward the subject. None of these hypotheses is
supported. In the TIMSS data, students liking math and science and time
spent reading for pleasure was unrelated to the existence of a CBEEES.
In Canadian data, students in exam provinces spent significantly more
time reading for pleasure, significantly more time watching science pro-
grams on TV, while watching less TV overall. Student attitudes were also
more positive. Students in CBEEPS provinces were significantly more
likely to believe that "science is useful in everyday life." Regarding beliefs
that "math is useful in solving everyday problems," there were no differ-
ences between CBEEES and non-CBEEES provinces. Finally,students
in exam provinces were not more likelyto say that extrinsic rewards (e.g.,
getting a better job) would result from doing well in math and science.
Their view apparently reflects Canadian reality. A check of a small sample
of job applications obtained from Canadian employers revealed that they
typically do not ask for exam grades or GPAs.
4.7. Impacts on the behaviour of parents: hypothesis 3
Information on parental attitudes and involvement with their children's
studies was available only in the IAEP data on Canada. Parents in
CBEEES provinces were significantly more likely to talk to their children
about their math and science classes, and their children were more likely
to report that their parents "are interested in science" or "want me to do
well in math." Parents in high SES schools were also more likely to talk
to their children about science class and to be reported to be "interested
in science" and to "want me to do well in math."
5. Summary
Theory predicts that improved signalling of academic achievement
that results from curriculum-based external exit exams will raise
achievement in examined subjects. Testing this hypothesis is difficult
because it can be assessed only by comparing education systems, not
by comparing individuals, classrooms, or schools. Consequently, the
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number of independent observations is inevitably small and the
power of formal statistical tests is correspondingly reduced. The small
number of independent observations also heightens worries about
omitted variable bias and selection bias. Our approach to dealing with
these inference problems is to find as many comparative data sets as
possible that cover different sets of countries and provinces and dif-
ferent subjects and to test whether there is a consistent tendency for
jurisdictions with CBEEESs to have higher achievement, as theory.
predicts.
Our review of the evidence suggests that theory and the claims of
advocates of such examination systems are probably correct. Analyses
of three very different international cross-section data sets found that
students from countries with such systems outperform students from
other countries at a comparable economic development level in four dif-
ferent subjects-science, mathematics, reading and geography. The pro-
portion of Swedish students taking rigorous mathematics and science
courses in upper secondary school fell after exit examinations were
eliminated in the early 1970s. Additionally, students living in Canadian
provinces (and US states) with such exams know more science and
mathematics than students in other provinces/states. The variance of
student achievement in countries and provinces with a CBEEES is no
higher than in jurisdictions that lack such exams.
The paper then turned to an investigation of how the higher
achievement comes about. CBEEESs are not associated with higher
teacher-pupil ratios nor greater spending on K-12 education. But they are
associated with higher minimum standards for entry into the teaching
profession, higher teacher salaries, a greater likelihood of having teachers
specialise in teaching one subject in middle schoo~ a greater likelihood of
hiring teachers who have majored in the subject they will teach, and ad-
ditional hours of instruction in examination subjects. Te-<lchers'satisfac-
tion with their jobs appe-ArSto be lower, possibly because of the in-
creased pressure for accountability that results from the existence of
good signals of individual student achievement. Science labs are better in
CBEEES jurisdictions. The number of computers and library books per
student areunaffected by CBEEESs.
Fears that CBE~s have caused the quality of instruction to deterio-
rate seem unfounded. Students in CBEEES jurisdictions are less likely to
report that memorisation is the way to learn the subject and more likely
to report that they did experiments in science class. Apparently, teachers
subject to the subtle pressure of a provincial exam four years in the fu-
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ture adopt strategies that are conventionally viewed as "best prac..-tice,"
not strategies designed to maximise scores on multiple-choice tests.
Quizzes and tests are more common, but in other respects, our indica-
tors of pedagogy are no different in CBEEES jurisdictions. Students are
also more likely to get tutoring assistance from teachers after school.
They are not less likelyto say that they like the subject, and they are more
likely to agree with the statement that science is useful in every day life.
Students also tUked with their parents more about school work and re-
ported that their parents had more positive attitudes about the subject.
Some of the evidence on how student effort varies with exam systems
seems inconsistent. [n the analysis of Canadian data, students in
C"BEEES provinces did more homework and watched less TV. But in
the cross-section of nations analysis, students in CBEEES nations did
considerably less homework and spent considerably more time watching
1V and hanging out with friends. Additional theoretical and empirical
work is needed to resolve this discrepancy.
Important as CBEEESs may be, they are not the only or even the
most important determinant of achievement levels. General produc-
tivity levels and standards of living, and an East Asian culture appear
to have even larger effects. CBEEESs are common in developing
nations where achievement levels are often quite low (e.g., Columbia
and Iran). Belgium and Sweden, by contrast, have high-quality educa-
tion systems without having a CBEEES. But the results suggest that
achievement would be even higher if the CentralaProv in Sweden be-
came an important part of students' final course grades (as occurs
with Canadian diploma exams) and if school-by-school results on the
exam were published in national newspapers. Morc research on the
system level determinants of average achievement levels is clearly in
order.
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